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I. INTRODUCTION
Professional sports in America have always been big business. As
with all big business, labor disputes have ensued in each of the four major
professional American sports. Within the past twenty years, the National
Hockey League (hereinafter "NHL"), the National Basketball Association
(hereinafter "NBA"), the National Football League (hereinafter "NFL"),
and Major League Baseball (hereinafter "MLB") have all been subject to
some form of labor unrest.' Most commonly, these labor problems have
concerned the players and their respective unions. However, two recent
professional sports labor disruptions involved professional sports game
officials. Normally only noticed in sports when they make a bad call,
officials came to the forefront of sports labor law in both 1999 and 2001.
In 1999, in a move that some have called puzzling, others "a formula for
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1. See C. Peter Goplerud III, Collective Bargaining in the National Football League:
A Historical and Comparative Analysis, 4 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 13, 16, 35-37 (1997)
(noting numerous labor issues of the four leagues throughout the 1980s and 1990s, including
both lockouts and strikes).
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disaster," fifty-seven of sixty-eight members of the Major League Umpires'
Association (hereinafter "MLUA") sent their letters of resignation to the
American League (hereinafter "AL") and the National League (hereinafter
"NL") offices of MLB. 2 While the MLUA later claimed that this was
merely a symbolic gesture in an effort to force negotiations prior to the end
of their present collective bargaining agreement, citing what they believed
to be the impending threat of a lockout, MLB simply accepted the
resignations.3  While all of the umpires eventually rescinded their
resignations, twenty-two were left without jobs following the 1999 season.
In the summer of 2001, it was the NFL's turn to undergo a dispute
with its officials. During that summer, the NFL could not come to terms on
a new contract with the National Football League Referees' Association
(hereinafter "NFLRA").4 Noting what it considered to be the extremely
high demands of the NFLRA, the NFL locked out the officials less than
two weeks prior to the start of the 2001 season, opting to use replacement
referees until the end of the dispute.5
Taking a close look at these two disputes, a strange outcome emerges.
Contrary to logic, getting locked out actually seems like a comparatively
favorable alternative for a union facing an impasse in contract negotiations.
In the simplest terms, a lockout "occur[s] when employers attempt to put
economic pressure on a group of employees by refusing to allow them to
,6work." It is strange that the lockout should be considered favorable to a
union in any respect, since it has been considered the employer's ultimate
"weapon[] of industrial warfare., 7 In the NFLRA-NFL dispute, the NFL
used the lockout device rather successfully, eventually reaching an
agreement with the NFLRA worth far less than the union's initial demands
2. Murray Chass, Umpires' Strategy Is a Mystery to Everybody Except the Umpires,
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1999, at D3; John O'Brien, The Umps' Bad Call: From the Major
League Umpires, a Puzzling Moment in Labor History, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 6,
1999, at A21.
3. Complaint of Plaintiffs at par. 28, Major League Umpires' Ass'n v. Am. League of
Prof'I Baseball Clubs, 591 PLI/PAT 145, 156 (E.D. Pa. 1999)(No. 99-4352).
4. See Mike Freeman, N.F.L. May Lock Out Referees Unless Talks Progress, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 9, 2001, at D1; NFL Talks With Refs at 2-Minute Warning, S.D. UNION-TRIB.,
Aug. 10, 2001, at D4 (discussing the lack of progress in negotiations between the NFL and
the NFLRA).
5. See Mike Freeman, N.F.L. Locks Out Officials as Negotiations Falter, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 29, 2001, at D1; Gary Myers, It's Official: League Locks Out Refs, DAILY NEWS (New
York), Aug. 29, 2001, at Sports 56 (detailing the specifics of potential replacement officials'
role within the NFL).
6. Grant M. Hayden, Some Keys to the NBA Lockout, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
453, 454-55 (1999). For a more detailed description of a lockout, see Michael H. LeRoy,
Lockouts Involving Replacement Workers: An Empirical Public Policy Analysis And
Proposal To Balance Economic Weapons Under The NLRA, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 981 (1996).
7. Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 338 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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of a 400% to 500% wage increase.8 Therefore, at first glance it would
appear that the lockout was an effective means for the NFL to deal with the
NFLRA's attempt to force higher wages and benefits. However, when
comparing the results to the results of the MLUA resignation scheme,
accepting the lockout emerges as the best, and possibly the only, alternative
for a union once it becomes clear that the employer intends to lock a union
out when negotiations reach the point of impasse. Despite not getting all of
their demands met, the members of the NFLRA did secure a substantial
wage increase, and also retained their jobs. The MLUA, on the other hand,
believing negotiation to be hopeless and a lockout imminent, attempted to
preempt a lockout by having its members resign. As demonstrated by the
results, the resignation strategy was a complete failure.
Using these two labor disputes, along with an examination of the
seminal lockout cases in American labor law history, this comment will
attempt to show that when faced with an imminent lockout, a union has
only three options: negotiate to settlement, strike, or accept the lockout. As
seen in the MLUA dispute, attempting other, more creative ways out of the
dispute may spell disaster.
Part II of this comment will examine the facts of both labor disputes.
The discussion will include the demands of the unions and their respective
leagues, the events leading up to the actions in question, and the resolution
of each situation. Part III will delve into the seminal case law and statutes
concerning the legality of lockouts. Part IV will then apply the case law to
the NFLRA dispute, proving that the action taken by the NFL was a legal
and effective lockout. Upon imagining that the officials from the MLUA
had not resigned, the section will also look at the legality of a possible
MLB lockout. Part V will look at the legality of MLB's response to the
resignation scheme of the MLUA by following the reasoning of United
States District Judge Harvey Bartle III of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania in his December 13, 2001 opinion in The Major League
Umpires' Association v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs.
Part VI will compare what was lost by the MLUA as a result of their novel
resignation scheme to what the umpires could have gained by accepting a
lockout.
8. Edward Wong, N.F.L. Officials Approve Pact and Will Be Back Sunday, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2001, at D4.
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II. THE FACTS
A. The 2001 Lockout of the NFLRA
In March of 2001,9 the seven-year contract between the 119 NFLRA
on-field game officials and the NFL expired.' ° The NFL and the NFLRA
knew very early on that negotiating a new contract was going to be
difficult. Accordingly, the NFL and the NFLRA began to negotiate well in
advance, starting in July of 2000.1 However, with the summer of 2001
winding down, and the 2001 NFL season only weeks away, the two sides
were no closer to an agreement than they had been in July of 2000.
2
Although the NFLRA was seeking increased benefits and appearance
fees, their main demand was for a substantial per-game wage increase. In
the final year of their contract, wages ranged from between $1,431 per
game for a rookie official, to $4,330 per game for a twenty-year veteran.13
However, the officials felt that these wages were an insult when compared
to other major professional sports officials in North America. Tom
Condon, lead negotiator for the NFLRA, summed up the union's main
grievance by stating, "[we] are looking to be paid along the lines of other
top sports [officials] .... A twenty-five year [NFLRA officiating veteran],
as it is now, would make less than a rookie in the other three [American
professional sports] leagues.'
' 4
While the NFLRA's reasoning may sound like a plausible justification
for an increase in pay, the NFL saw two distinct problems with the union's
logic. First, the NFL considers NFLRA game officials part-time
employees. Each referee only works one game a week during the five-
week pre-season and seventeen-week regular season. Referees are
individually chosen to work the playoffs and Super Bowl, and are paid for
this additional work on a per-game basis. The NFL's contention is
supported by the fact that referees hold unrelated jobs during the week,
many of which are lucrative occupations, such as doctors, lawyers, and
9. Despite occurring later chronologically than the events involving in the MLUA
labor dispute, the situation of the NFLRA is addressed first in order to present a typical
lockout and its desired outcome.
10. See Freeman, N.F.L. Locks Out Officials as Negotiations Falter, supra note 5.
11. Id.
12. See Mike Freeman, Officials In N.F.L. Consider Job Action, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23,
2001, at D2.
13. See Referees Need Reality Check As Lockout Looms, USA TODAY, Aug. 24, 2001
[hereinafter Reality Check].
14. Tom Pedulla & Larry Weisman, NFL, Referees Talk Amid Lockout Threat, USA
TODAY, Aug. 14, 2001, at CI.
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engineers."5 While the officials of the NBA, NHL, and MLB earn between
$93,000 to $250,000 per year, MLB umpires call eight times as many
games in a season than NFL officials, while NHL and NBA referees call
four times as many. 16 The NFLRA defended their position by pointing out
that travel time, game preparation, and physical conditioning push their
weekly officiating responsibilities to between forty and fifty hours per
week. 17 However, league spokesman Greg Aiello disagreed: "[I]t is a part-
time job. It is what it is: fifteen games during the regular season, no travel
during the week, no demand on their time during the week."'
18
The NFL's second problem with the NFLRA's demands was the size
of the wage increase sought. The NFLRA initially believed that to bring
their wages to an amount comparable with other major professional sports,
increases of up to 500% were necessary.' 9 In their final proposal prior to
the lockout, the NFLRA came down slightly from that number, seeking
200% to 400% increases, effective immediately. 0 While quite smaller, the
NFL's proposal still offered a substantial graduated wage increase, starting
with a 40% raise in 2001, escalating to a full 100% by 2003.21 NFL
commissioner Paul Tagliabue, in his personal plea to the NFLRA to accept
this offer, made it quite clear that if this proposal were not accepted, the
NFL would be forced to lock out the officials once the contract expired.22
In coming to this conclusion, Tagliabue cited concerns that an in-season
work stoppage by the NFLRA would be too detrimental to the league, and
23that he had received no promise by the NFLRA not to strike.
As a lockout was becoming more and more likely, the league initiated
a search for replacement referees. Beginning on August 23, 2001, the NFL
hired replacement referees from the ranks of college football, arena
football, and the NFL Europe, offering each official $2,000 per game,
along with a guaranteed $4,000 one-time payment if the labor dispute was
solved prior to the regular season start on September 9th.24 In total, the
25league hired 120 replacement referees.  On August 28, 2001, when bothsides rejected their respective final offers, the NFL locked out the NFLRA,
15. See Freeman, N.F.L. Locks Out Officials as Negotiations Falter, supra note 5;
Leonard Shapiro, Officials Urged to Consider Offer; NFL Commissioner Tagliabue Calls
League's Final Proposal 'Substantial', WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2001, at D3.
16. See Reality Check, supra note 13.
17. See Shapiro, supra note 15.
18. Myers, supra note 5.
19. See Pedulla & Weisman, supra note 14.
20. See Highlights of NFL's Proposal To Refs, USA TODAY, Aug. 24, 2001, at C11.
21. Id.
22. See Shapiro, supra note 15.
23. Id.
24. Larry Weisman, NFL Hiring Substitute Officials, USA TODAY, Aug. 23, 2001, at
C 1; Wong, supra note 8.
25. See Myers, supra note 5.
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26citing an inability to come to terms on a new contract .
The replacement referees warmed up by calling the final preseason
game. Days before the September 9th start of the regular season, the
league increased their offer one last time to a 60% raise for the 2001
campaign, but it was again rejected by the NFLRA, who chose instead to
accept the lockout z7
Two days after the start of the regular season, the September 11, 2001
tragedy occurred, wherein terrorists hijacked four American jets and
crashed the planes into the World Trade Center's Twin Towers in New
York City, the Pentagon, and rural Pennsylvania, events resulting in the
deaths of thousands. 28 From that point on, negotiations in the NFL-NFLRA
dispute became more productive. Following the attacks, the NFL chose to
postpone that week's upcoming games, which were eventually played at
the end of the season.29 During the tumultuous days following September
11, the officials decided that during the time of national crisis, getting back
to work was most important; on September 19th, the NFLRA accepted an
offer by the league that looked almost identical to the NFL's final
graduated plan.30 The lockout ended with the officials only gaining 20% on
the league's base offer of a 40% raise in 2001, clearly a minimal amount
when they were asking for between 200% and 500%." However, their jobs
were secure, and they were on the field by the following weekend.
B. The 1999 MLUA Resignation Scheme
1999 was the last year of the 1995 "Basic Agreement between the NL,
the AL, and the MLUA," covering terms and conditions of employment for
umpires calling MLB games.32 Along with benefits and a termination pay
package, this agreement paid MLUA members between $75,000 and
$250,000 per year, depending on seniority.33  Most importantly, it
contained a clause barring the umpires from striking. 4 Going into the mid-
26. Id.; Freeman, supra note 5.
27. Bob Glauber, NFL: Final Offer to Refs, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Sept. 6, 2001, at A74.
28. N. R. Kleinfield, Hijacked Jets Destroy Twin Towers and Hit Pentagon in Day of
Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001.
29. Adam Schefter, Time Out To Mourn NFL Calls Off Week 2 Games To 'Grieve,
Reflect', DENVER POST, Sept. 14, 2001, at D-I.
30. See Wong, supra note 8.
31. Id.
32. Complaint of Plaintiffs at para. 14, Major League Umpires' Ass'n v. Am. League of
Prof'I Baseball Clubs, 591 PLUPAT 145, 156 (E.D. Pa. 1999)(No. 99-4352).
33. Baseball's Umpires Plan To Quit On Sept. 2; Resigning In Protest Would Not
Violate Contract; They Would Get Severance Pay; Decision Seems To Please Owners, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, July 15, 1999, at Al [hereinafter Baseball's Umpires Plan to Quit].
34. Heather R. Insley, Major League Umpires Association: Is Collective Bargaining the
Answer to or the Problem in the Contractual Relationships of Professional Sports Today?,
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season All-Star break in July of 1999, the league showed no signs of
urgency in attempting to reach a new deal. Already harboring a list of
grievances against MLB, the MLUA feared that the league's indifferent
attitude towards a new agreement signaled its intention to lock the umpires
out at the end of the 1999 season.35 But before getting to how those events
played out, some background is necessary.
In 1969, the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter "NLRB")
certified the MLUA to represent the umpires of MLB, making them the
first certified major professional sports officials' union in America.36 Since
the certification, the MLUA and MLB have endured a rather rocky
relationship. Less than a year after their certification, the MLUA staged
their first strike immediately prior to the 1970 post-season. This was the
first of many strikes by the MLUA throughout the 1970s and 1980s.37 The
league also got in on the game by locking out the umpires on several
occasions, most recently in 1995 when MLB locked the MLUA out of the
first eighty-six games of that season. 38 This lockout ended when the two
sides formulated the Basic Agreement, the agreement that was set to expire
after the end of the 1999 season. The difficult negotiation surrounding that
agreement surely fed the MLUA's fears of an impending lockout at the end
of 1999.
Thus, in the summer of 1999, the MLUA feared that the league's
reluctance to negotiate a new deal was a clear sign of its intention to lock
the union out.3 9 The MLUA was already upset with MLB for what it
considered to be violations of the still-active 1995 Agreement. The union
complained that MLB engaged in activities with the clear intent "to
undermine the MLUA as the chosen bargaining representative and to make
changes to the umpires' terms and conditions of employment which
violated the Agreement., 40  Specifically, the MLUA found fault with
MLB's attempt to take control away from the AL and NL with respect to
the umpires' supervision and evaluation, MLB's unilateral changes in the
strike zone, and MLB's alleged attempts to induce certain umpires to retire
by offering larger severance packages than granted by the Agreement.4'
Also, the MLUA complained of what it considered to be the league's unfair
treatment of certain umpires, and of the lack of player punishment
29 CAP. U. L. REV. 601, 617 (2001).
35. Peter Schmuck, Umpires Spurred by Fear of Lockout; McKean: Union's Threat of
Sept. 2 Resignation is Bid 'To Force the Issue', BALTIMORE SUN, July 16, 1999, at D7.
36. See Insley, supra note 34, at 608.
37. Id. at616.
38. See Baseball's Umpires Plan to Quit, supra note 33.
39. See Schmuck, supra note 35.
40. Complaint of Plaintiffs at para. 16, Major League Umpires' Ass'n v. Am. League of
Prof'I Baseball Clubs, 591 PLUPAT 145, 156 (E.D. Pa. 1999)(No. 99-4352).
41. Id. at para. 18-19.
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42following recent confrontations between umpires and players.
Not content with leaving their fate in the hands of MLB, Richie
Phillips, attorney and chief negotiator for the MLUA, 43 formulated a novel
plan. Rather than wait for a lockout, Phillips asked the sixty-eight
members of the MLUA to simply resign. Under his plan, the umpires
would collectively send letters of resignation to the league in mid-July,
effective September 2, in the hope that this would spur MLB into
accelerated negotiations. 4  However, if a deal was not made by the
September 2nd deadline, Phillips included a contingency plan that he
believed would protect the union. A new professional umpiring company
would be incorporated by Phillips, and would sign all of the umpires to
contracts that would become effective on September 3rd.45 A combination
of those actions on the part of the umpires would leave the league with only
two options: hire sixty-eight replacements for the last month of the regular
season, or contract with this new company for its services.
Fifty-seven of sixty-eight members of the MLUA chose to implement
Phillips' plan. On July 15, 1999, the MLUA submitted twenty-three letters
46
of resignation to the AL, and thirty-four letters to the NL. While the
MLUA publicly stated that the letters were meant simply to spur
negotiation, not to actually sever their employment with MLB, the
language employed in the resignation letters clearly appeared to give the
legal effect of resignation. These letters stated "that the resignation was
'pursuant to' Article VIH.D of the Basic Agreement, a provision that
applies only when an umpire's employment is 'terminated' by the umpire's
own action and not by action taken by the Leagues., 47 Those umpires who
qualified also immediately demanded their termination pay, which ranged
from $150,000 to $400,000, and totaled over $15 million.4 s
Immediately, sportswriters around the nation began to question the
logic of this move. More importantly, so did the league. League Vice
President Sandy Alderson decried the scheme as "either a threat to be
42. Insley, supra note 34, at 617.
43. See Murray Chass, 14 Major League Umps Call Union Plan Flawed, N.Y. TIMES,
July 29, 1999, at D3.
44. See Schmuck, supra note 35.
45. Hal Bodley, Unhappy MLB Umpires Say They'll Resign Sept. 2, USA TODAY, July
15, 1999, atC1.
46. Complaint of Plaintiffs at para. 27, Major League Umpires' Ass'n v. Am. League of
Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 591 PLI/PAT 145, 156 (E.D. Pa. 1999)(No. 99-4352).
47. Declaration of Gene A. Budig at para. 10, Major League Umpires' Ass'n v. Am.
League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 591 PLI/PAT 145, 254 (E.D. Pa. 1999)(No. 99-4352)
[hereinafter Declaration of Budig]; Declaration of Leonard S. Coleman, Jr. at par. 4, Major
League Umpires' Ass'n v. Am. League of Prof'I Baseball Clubs, 591 PLI/PAT 145, 244
(E.D. Pa. 1999)(No. 99-4352) [hereinafter Declaration of Coleman].
48. Id.
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ignored, or an offer to be accepted. ' 49 MLB made it obvious that it was not
going to be bullied and would not give in to the MLUA's plan. The
League announced that it would accept the resignations and hire
replacement umpires to begin work on September 3, 1999.' 0 The League's
unwavering stance clearly began to affect some of the members of the
MLUA. Initially, eleven of its members chose not to resign. However, by
July 20th, five of the fifty-seven resigning umpires changed their minds,
officially rescinding their resignations. 51  Thereafter, more and more
umpires rescinded their resignations; within a week, all fifty-seven umpires
had rescinded.52 Phillips' plan had failed.
As if it were not bad enough that the MLUA's attempt to force
negotiations for a new contract had failed, troubles were just beginning for
twenty-two members of the MLUA. The league announced that it had
already hired replacement umpires, and therefore, that it would accept
some of the resignations. By July 23rd, the AL had hired twelve new
umpires to fill some of the vacancies, while the NL had hired thirteen by
July 28th.53 Intent on keeping these new umpires, the AL and NL each
determined that only the remaining spots needed to round out their
umpiring squads would be available to those who rescinded their
resignations. The AL was able to apply a first-come, first-served approach,
accepting the first fourteen rescinded resignations received.54  The NL,
however, received all of the rescinded resignations at one time, and
therefore was unable to employ this method. Instead, they chose to decide
on the fate of their umpires with performance standards.55 In the end, the
resignations of twenty-two MLUA members were accepted.56
Not only had the MLUA's resignation scheme failed, but as of
September 3, 1999, twenty-two of its members were also out of a job.
With nothing to lose, the union challenged MLB's stance in court in an
attempt to have their members reinstated. In court and arbitration for more
than two years, the case has most recently been decided by the United
States District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, a decision that
49. Schmuck, supra note 35.
50. See 5 AL Umps Rescind Resignations, BALTIMORE SUN, July 21, 2001, at D4.
51. Id.
52. Richard Justice, Several More Umpires Withdraw Their Resignations, WASH. POST,
July 22, 1999, at D1; All Umpires Take Back Resignations, CHICAGO SuN-TIMES, July 28,
1999, at 123; Murray Chass, The Umpires Change Their Call: They No Longer Want to
Resign, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1999, at Al.
53. Declaration of Budig, supra note 47, at para. 16; Declaration of Coleman, supra
note 47, at para. 8.
54. See Declaration of Budig, supra note 47, at para. 17.
55. See Declaration of Coleman, supra note 47, at para. 10.
56. See 22 Umpires Lose Jobs For Rest of the Season; Union Withdraws Suit In
Exchange for Pay, Bonuses; Dispute Will Go To Arbitration, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Sept. 2, 1999, at Al.
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will be fully explored in Section V below. In brief, Judge Harvey Bartle Ill
agreed with an arbiter, declaring that MLB must rehire, with back pay, at
least nine of the twenty-two umpires, with the fate of three remanded for
further evaluation. However, ten umpires were denied reinstatement
because the court found that they had resigned. 7
The failed resignation scheme completely decimated the MLUA. Not
only did the scheme fail to force negotiations, the plan actually resulted in
the formation of a new union, and the firing of Richie Phillips.58 More
importantly, it caused at least ten umpires to be permanently out of the
officiating job, and nine held jobless for over two years. It appears that the
resignation scheme achieved only one of its goals: it avoided a lockout.
III. THE LOCKOUT IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW
The lockout has been used by employers in America for over 350
years. 59 However, the National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter "NLRA")
does not specifically take a position on this labor weapon. 60 Instead, the
legality of this device developed almost exclusively in the 1950s and 60s,
in a series of three United States Supreme Court cases, and one NLRB
decision, along with another NLRB decision in 1987.61 These cases build
on the concept of a legal lockout, each adding a situation in which an
employer may use the device. Prior to analyzing the legality of the NFL's
lockout decision or the feared lockout by MLB, it is important to review
these cases to develop a clear picture of what the courts have determined to
be a legal lockout.
The NLRA's failure to either sanction or prohibit the lockout was no
mere oversight. A proposed version of section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA
57. See The Major League Umpires' Ass'n v. Am. League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs,
No. 01-2790 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2001). At time of publication, appeals to this decision are
pending in the Third Circuit.
58. See Insley, supra note 34, at 619-620.
59. See Susan L. Dolin, Lockouts In Evolutionary Perspective: The Changing Balance
Of Power In American Industrial Relations, 12 VT. L. REv. 335 (1987).
60. Peter C. Verrochi, It is Not a Violation of Section 8(a)(1) or (3) of The National
Labor Relations Act for an Employer to Lockout and Temporarily Replace His Union-
Represented Employees Solely as a Means of Pressuring the Union Into Settling a Contract
Dispute on Terms Favorable to the Employer, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 961, 964 (1987).
61. See id. at 964-968; Dolin, supra note 59, at 353-384, 407, 408; Damon E. Dunn,
ILLINOIS INSTITUTE FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION: THE LABOR LAW HANDBOOK 11.32
(Levin & Funkhouser 1999); Michael H. LeRoy, Lockouts Involving Replacement Workers:
An Empirical Public Policy Analysis and Proposal to Balance Economic Weapons Under
the NLRA, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 981, 997-1007 (1996). While the individual analyses of the
cases in this section are the work of the author of this comment, credit must be extended to
these authors, as it is their work that originally turned this author towards the particular line
of cases. All the authors discuss the legal evolution of the lockout, and some, if not all, of
the cases mentioned in this section.
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originally barred the lockout from use by employers as a means to "impair
62the right of employees guaranteed in" the Act. However, the reference to
the lockout was removed after members of the Senate voiced their opinion
that this proposal created a lopsided effect, wherein employees could strike
(a right specifically protected by the NLRA), but employers were left no
economic weapon of their own.63 Therefore, without statutory proscription
or backing, the lockout would be forced to gain legal support through the
courts.
The case considered to be the first approval of an employer's use of a
lockout is NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, more commonly
known as Buffalo Linen.64 This case involved an employer's use of a
lockout as a defensive measure. In Buffalo Linen, a dispute arose between
the Linen and Credit Exchange of Buffalo, an organization comprised of
eight separate linen supply employers, and the Truck Drivers Local Union
61No. 449, who represented employees from all eight supply companies.
After contract negotiations faltered, the union engaged in a "whipsaw
strike," wherein the employees of each of the eight companies prepared to
66take turns engaging in actual work stoppage. A whipsaw strike carried to
its full effect involves a union choosing one of the employers in the multi-
employer unit, and having only the employees for that one employer strike.
An impasse that survives beyond the first strike results in the union
choosing another employer to strike, and so on down the line, until all of
the employers in the unit finally yield to the union's demands.6' However,
in Buffalo Linen, the union was not allowed to carry out its whipsaw strike
plan; in response to the first unit going on strike, the employers of the
seven other companies locked out their employees, stating that their
employment would only be allowed to continue if the strike ended. 68 The
Supreme Court in this case was presented with "the narrow question.., of
whether a temporary lockout may lawfully be used as a defense to a union
strike tactic. ,,69 While the union claimed that a lockout would interfere
with their statutory right to strike, the Court reasoned that "the right of
employees to strike.., is not so absolute as to deny self-help by employers
62. Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 314 (1965).
63. Id. at 317.
64. NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957). See Dolin,
supra note 59, at 353; LeRoy, supra note 61, at 999; Verrochi, supra note 60, at 964-965.
65. Truck Drivers Union Local No. 449, 353 U.S. at 89.
66. Id. at 90.
67. See Angel M. Aton & Heidi S. Connolly, Note, The Debate Over the Unionization
and Collective Bargaining of Private Physicians, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 659, 683
(2001).
68. Id. at 90.
69. Id. at 93.
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when legitimate interests of employees and employers collide. 70 In this
case, the employers had an interest in preserving their multi-employer
bargaining method to avoid competition between themselves." The Court
declared that in cases where the employer faced economic hardship
because of a union's actions, the NLRB must balance the conflicting
interests in deciding whether a lockout may be employed.72 In this narrow
instance, the Supreme Court recognized an employer's right to lock out its
employees.
Eight years later, the Court decided two cases on the same day that
would add to the lockout doctrine. First, in American Ship Building
Company v. NLRB, the Court permitted the use of an offensive lockout by
an employer.73 The American Ship Building Company could not reach an
agreement on a new contract with its employees. Fearful that a strike
during a busy period of their seasonal business would destroy the company,
American Ship locked out a majority of its workforce until a new contract
could be negotiated.74 A trial examiner for the NLRB found that, while
motivated by economic concerns, the employer engaged in the lockout in
an effort to break the impasse in negotiations. 7' As in Buffalo Linen, the
union claimed that a lockout would interfere with their rights to bargain
and strike. The Supreme Court, however, declared that "the right
exclusively to bargain collectively does not entail any 'right' to insist on
one's position free from economic disadvantage. 76 Similarly, the Court
also stated that the right to strike is not equal to "the right exclusively to
determine the timing and duration of all work stoppages. '77 The Court held
that there is nothing in the NLRA to prevent an offensive lockout, as long
78as the lockout is motivated by a desire to settle a labor dispute.
Conversely, the lockout would be illegal if motivated by a "hostility to the
process of collective bargaining." 79 This translates into either a desire to
80
discourage union membership, or to completely avoid bargaining.
American Ship Building not only supported the use of a second type of
lockout, it also pointed to conditions that all lockouts must meet.
On the same day in 1965, the Supreme Court also decided NLRB v.
70. Id. at 96.
71. Id. at 97.
72. Id. at 96.
73. 380 U.S. 300 (1965). An offensive lockout differs from a defensive lockout in that
it is implemented by the employer in anticipation of, rather than in reaction to, a strike on
the part of the union.
74. Id. at 304.
75. Id. at 305.
76. Id. at 309.
77. Id. at310.
78. Id. at313.
79. Id. at 309.
80. Id.; Dunn, supra note 61, at 11.32.
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Brown, this one returning to the Buffalo Linen issue of a defensive lockout
in response to a whipsaw strike. 8' The facts differed from the earlier case
in that rather than closing their stores during the lockout, as was done in
Buffalo Linen, the employer in Brown chose instead to hire temporary
replacement workers.82 First, the Court declared the lockout to be "within
83the rule of Buffalo Linen" permitting defensive lockouts. It then found
little difference between the two cases, stating that while pressures are
surely greater on the union when replacements are used, the pressure is "the
result of the [local's] inability to make effective use of the whipsaw
tactic. 84 Once again, the Supreme Court stated that no employee right
85protected by the NLRA had been violated. The use of replacement
workers in a defensive lockout was legitimized.
In most situations, after an agreement has expired, the parties will
continue to bargain until either a new agreement is reached, or the
negotiations reach an impasse. Up to this point, all legal lockouts,
defensive as well as offensive, had occurred following that impasse. Three
years after the Supreme Court decisions in 1965, the NRLB handed down
an order that expanded the lockout doctrine even further. In Darling and
86Company and Lewis Lane , the employer locked its employees out prior to
actually reaching an impasse. In its controversial decision, the NLRB
found that an impasse was not a necessary criterion for a legal lockout.87
While the absence of an impasse was found to be one noteworthy
circumstance when evaluating the motivation for the lockout, the Board
stated that the mere "absence of an impasse does not of itself make a
lockout unlawful any more than the mere existence of an impasse
automatically renders a lockout lawful. 88 After Darling and Company, an
impasse in negotiations was no longer a requirement of the lockout.
Lastly, towards the end of what one author has called a period in
which "replacement lockouts occurred nearly continuously," the NLRB
89
delivered a decision to add the final piece to the lockout doctrine. In
Harter Equipment, Inc. v. Local 825, International Union of Operating
Engineers, AFL-CIO, the employer, Harter Equipment, hired temporary
replacements during an offensive lockout.90 Up to now, only employers in
defensive lockouts had been formally permitted to utilize temporary
81. 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
82. Id. at 281.
83. Id. at 288.
84. Id. at 286.
85. Id. at 286.
86. 171 N.L.R.B. 801 (1968).
87. Id. at 802.
88. Id. at 803.
89. LeRoy, supra note 61, at 1011.
90. 280 N.L.R.B. 597 (1986).
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employees. However, the Board stated that the use of temporary
employees simply "bring[s] economic pressure to bear in support of a
legitimate bargaining position," the exact same result that the Supreme
Court in American Ship Building claimed was brought by an offensive
lockout in general. 91 Seeing no persuasive reason to bar a practice that it
believed was supported by American Ship Building, the NLRB stated that
an offensive lockout that uses temporary employees "is a measure
reasonably adapted to the achievement of a legitimate end. 92 The last
piece of the lockout was complete.
Evolving through those five decisions, today the lockout, if properly
motivated, seems to be available in every possible form. First, it may be
either defensive, in response to an action taken by a union, normally in the
case of a whipsaw strike; or offensive, in an effort to bring economic
pressure upon the union. Second, employers instituting both offensive and
defensive lockouts may employ temporary labor during the length of a
lockout. This not only allows the employer to stay in business during the
dispute, but brings added economic pressure to the company's bargaining
position. Third, where an agreement has expired, an employer may call a
lockout prior to actually reaching an impasse in negotiations. The only
significant limitation that remains is that the legality of every lockout still
depends on the motivation of the employer. An employer may not be
motivated by anti-union sentiment, nor by a desire to avoid collective
bargaining altogether. Yet, so long as a lockout is found lacking in these
nefarious characteristics, under current law the Supreme Court and the
NLRB will deem the device legal.
IV. LOCKOUT LAW APPLIED TO THE NFL AND MLB DISPUTES
As described above, the labor dispute between MLB and the MLUA
had a notably different procedure and outcome than the dispute between the
NFL and the NFLRA. This was no doubt a result of the stances each
respective union took in the face of a lockout. While fully aware that a
lockout was imminent, the NFLRA chose to pass on Commissioner
Tagliabue's final offer, accepting the lockout.93 The MLUA, on the other
hand, sure that they would be locked out at the end of the 1999 season as
had already happened in 1995, took a different, disastrous route by trying
to pre-empt any move by MLB. While this action did effectively stop any
attempt of a lockout by MLB, it was at the cost of jobs, and certification of
the MLUA. Following the judicially created criteria for a legal lockout, it
is rather obvious that the NFL lockout clearly met these standards.
91. Id. at 599.
92. Id.
93. See Shapiro, supra note 15.
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Although speculating, the MLUA might have had arguments concerning
the legality of an MLB lockout if they had simply let MLB continue down
that path. However, the success of a legal challenge by the MLUA would
surely be up to the courts.
A. The NFL Lockout
To begin, the NFL lockout is partially analogous to the dispute in
American Ship Building Company v. NLRB94, the first case in which the
Supreme Court approved the use of an offensive lockout by an employer.
The American Ship Building Company operated four Great Lakes
shipyards, all of which primarily repaired ships.95 According to the facts of
the case, the ship repairing industry is highly seasonal, centered mainly
around the winter months.96 Any unplanned work stoppage during these
months would be very costly for the company, placing it in an especially
precarious situation if a ship was already in a dock to be repaired. After
more than two months of negotiations for a new collective bargaining
agreement, an impasse was reached between the union and the employer.97
Fearing that the union would wait to strike until the busy season, the
employer instead closed almost all portions of four shipyards, and
temporarily laid off most of the workforce until a settlement could be
reached. 98 Similarly, the activities of the NFL and NFLRA are also highly
seasonal. Football is largely played in the fall months, with the playoffs
extending into the early winter. While the NFL itself is engaged in many
activities during the off-season, such as the NFL college draft, the main
work of the referees generally lies between the months of August and
January. 99 As with American Ship Building, a strike in the off-season
would have very little, if any, effect, especially if the dispute were settled
prior to the start of the season. However, an unannounced strike during the
season could easily cripple the league, losing tens, if not hundreds, of
millions of dollars if forced to cancel games. As in American Ship
Building, negotiations between the NFL and NFLRA had clearly reached
an impasse. After weeks of negotiations, the NFLRA would not lessen its
demands, rejecting Commissioner Tagliabue's final proposal.1°° Citing the
fear of an in-season strike by the officials, and lack of a promise by the
94. 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
95. Id. at 302.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 303.
98. Id. at 304.
99. This is barring extraordinary events. In 2001, due to the September 11 tragedy, the
entire season was pushed back a week. Consequently, both the Super Bowl and the Pro
Bowl, the final two games of the season, were played in February.
100. See Shapiro, supra note 15.
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officials not to strike during the season, Tagliabue locked out the
NFLRA. 101 Up to this point, the NFL lockout is almost identical to the
American Ship Building lockout, and therefore completely legal.
The one difference between American Ship Building and the NFL
dispute is the use of replacement workers by the NFL. While the American
Ship Building Company simply decided to close its shipyards, the NFL had
no intention of canceling the 2001 season, instead hiring replacement
102referees 2. Not taking into account the public uproar that would ensue if
an NFL season was altogether cancelled, the league's commitments in the
form of player salaries, ticket sales, and venue leases made canceling an
unacceptable option. However, this did not affect the legality of the
lockout, since the practice of using replacement workers during an
offensive lockout was approved by the NLRB in Harter Equipment.103 As
with the NFL, Harter Equipment chose to hire temporary replacement
workers "so that it could resume operations and meet fixed expenses.
'' °4
There, the NLRB found nothing wrong with this practice in general,
believing it to simply put more pressure on employees without violating
any rights protected by the NLRA.' 05
Clearly, the NFL's lockout of its officials used devices that both the
Supreme Court and the NLRB would have deemed legal. More
importantly, the NFL's lockout did not contain any of the aspects which
both ruling bodies have deemed illegal in the lockout context.1°  Again
turning back to American Ship Building, the Supreme Court stated that a
lockout is illegal if motivated by a "hostility to the process of collective
bargaining." '0' The NLRB in Harter Equipment put it best when they
narrowed the description of this motivation down to both "specific union
animus" and "bad-faith bargaining."'10 8 These illegal motivations did not
apply to the NFL dispute. Aside from essentially calling their demands
unrealistic, one was hard-pressed to find any harsh words or actions by the
NFL against the NFLRA during the entire dispute. °9 Similarly, the union
never complained that it believed the NFL was attempting to discourage
union membership or existence. Also, there was no claim or evidence of
bad-faith bargaining, or of an attempt to completely avoid the collective
bargaining process by the NFL. On the contrary, the NFL repeatedly
101. Id.
102. See Myers, supra note 5.
103. Harter Equipment, Inc. v. Local 825, International Union of Operating Engineers,
AFL-CIO, 280 N.L.R.B. 597 (1986).
104. Id. at 597.
105. Id. at 599.
106. See supra page 28 (discussing illegal lockout characteristics).
107. American Ship Building, 380 U.S. 300, 309 (1965).
108. Harter Equipment, Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. at 597.
109. See Pedulla & Weisman, supra note 14.
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attempted to negotiate, publicly stating many times that they wanted to
reach an appropriate deal before a lockout became necessary."0 At one
time in August of 2001, league spokesman Greg Aiello called the
negotiations "priority number one," claiming that both the NFL and the
NFLRA were committed to getting a deal done. 1 ' Unless something
happened that we do not know about, it seems clear that the NFL engaged
in good-faith bargaining on the road to reaching an impasse in negotiations
with the NFLRA.
The NFL lockout of its officials met the judicially created
requirements for a legal lockout. It was classified as a type of lockout that
has been deemed legal, an offensive lockout with replacement workers; in
addition, the employer, the NFL, lacked any nefarious motivations that the
courts have deemed improper in this context.
B. The Preempted MLB Lockout
While in the end MLB never actually had to make a definitive
decision, the MLUA cited as a main reason for the resignation scheme a
fear that MLB planned on locking the umpires out following the 1999
season, the end of the 1995 Basic Agreement."' However, imagining that
the MLUA did not take its preemptive steps, and that at the expiration of
the agreement MLB did lock out the umpires, the MLUA may have had
strong arguments to challenge the legality of the lockout.
Any lockout by MLB would have been classified as an offensive
lockout. The no-strike clause of the Basic Agreement effectively
eliminated the need for a defensive lockout. Therefore, MLB would have
most likely waited until the end of the 1999 season, and then offensively
locked out the MLUA going into new contract negotiations. As with the
NFL, this situation would be analogous to the facts of American Ship
Building. Since the lockout would have only occurred after the season,
there furthermore would have been no need for replacement umpires.
However, the 1995 lockout of the MLUA began during the off-season, and
continued through half of the 1995 season." 3 If an extended strike of this
nature would have happened following the end of the 1999 season, the
Harter Equipment doctrine would have to have been employed, allowing
for the use of replacement workers during an offensive strike. Thus, as
with the NFL disputes, the two possible versions of a lockout the MLB
could have used most likely would have been legal.
110. Freeman, supra note 5; Gary Myers, Clock Ticking On Deal Between NFL, Zebras,
DAILY NEWS (New York), Aug. 10, 2001, at 90.
111. See Myers, supra note 5.
112. See Schmuck, supra note 35.
113. See Baseball's Umpires Plan to Quit, supra note 33.
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While the MLUA would not have been able to challenge the type of
lockout used, the union may have had arguments concerning the motivation
of MLB. To reiterate, for a lockout to be legal, it must not be motivated by
bad-faith negotiation, an attempt to avoid negotiation altogether, or anti-
union sentiment.' 14 First, while still months from the official end of the
1995 collective bargaining agreement, as of the July 15th resignations,
MLB had made very little effort to negotiate a new deal with the MLUA." 5
Combining this fact with the MLUA's belief that MLB was already
planning to lock out the umpires, it is a fair assumption that MLB would
not have increased their efforts to negotiate prior to locking out the
umpires. Clearly, the MLUA could have argued that a lockout without
prior meaningful negotiation was an attempt to completely bypass the
collective bargaining process, as barred by American Ship Building."6
Unfortunately, the courts have not set an explicit standard for the amount of
negotiating that is required for the employer's effort to be deemed a "good
faith" effort. Along the same lines, if MLB had not stepped up its
negotiations, the MLUA could have pointed to the fact that an impasse
most likely would not have been reached. While in Darling and Company
and Lewis Lane the NLRB stated that an impasse is not a necessary
criterion for a legal lockout, the Board did not state that a lack of an
impasse is irrelevant." 7 On the contrary, the NLRB stated that a lack of an
impasse should be weighed when determining the motivation for a
lockout."' This could have bolstered the MLUA's case that the lockout
was motivated by a desire to avoid collective bargaining.
Also, throughout the entire 1999 labor dispute and aftermath, certain
members of the MLUA complained that MLB was attempting to break the
union. While this statement was made after MLB chose to accept the
resignations of a large number of umpires, veteran umpire Joe West, quoted
in the Chicago Sun Times, had this to say about MLB's tactics:
Baseball's tactics are to break the union at any cost. (Attorney)
Ron Shapiro has counseled a majority of American League
114. Harter Equip., Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 597, 597 (1986)(stating that Harter Equipment's
lockout was legal because "There is no evidence that the Respondent was motivated by
specific union animus .... [and] there is no evidence [of] bad-faith bargaining before or after
lockout").
115. Sam Donnellon, Resigning Umps The Strife Of The Party, BUFFALO NEWS, July 15,
1999, at IF.
116. 380 U.S. 300, 309 (1965)(proposing that "proper analysis of the problem demands
that the simple intent[ion] to support the employer's bargaining position as to compensation
and the like be distinguished from a hostility to the process of collective bargaining that
could suffice to render a lockout unlawful.")
117. Darling & Co., 171 N.L.R.B. 801, 802 (1968)(confirming that the board did "not
find that the absence of an impasse renders the [American Ship Building] test per se
inapplicable.").
118. Id. at 803.
SPORTS LOCKOUTS
umpires in a covert operation to help his friend, (executive vice
president) Sandy Alderson, destroy this union. (Shapiro) has
interfered with the union's activities and undermined the general
operation. If I'm not mistaken, that is against the law." 9
While evidence of such allegations would surely be required, evidence
that West did not present at the time of this statement, the MLUA might
have offered properly substantiated instances such as this to support a
contention that an MLB lockout was motivated by anti-union sentiment.
Make no mistake: it would have been an uphill battle for the MLUA to
successfully challenge the legality of an MLB lockout. The lines are not
drawn as to how much negotiation constitutes good faith bargaining. Also,
while they had allegations against the league, the MLUA would have
needed some hard evidence to sustain a claim that MLB was attempting to
destroy the union. However, if even just on the point concerning
negotiation, the MLUA might have waged some serious challenges against
an MLB lockout. Yet, they chose to preempt this lockout.
V. THE LEGALITY OF THE RESIGNATION SCHEME, AND OF MLB'S
RESPONSE
Rather than accepting an imminent lockout, the MLUA, under the
leadership of Richie Phillips, instead chose to implement an ill-fated
resignation scheme. Having been relieved of the decision of whether or not
to lock out the umpires, MLB saw the resignation letters as "sav[ing]
management officials the trouble of playing hardball with [the umpires] in
the off-season."'20 Unfortunately for the MLUA, while there may have
been credible arguments against the legality of a lockout, MLB's response
to the resignations was approved in the December 14, 2001 opinion of
Judge Harvey Bartle III in The Major League Umpires' Association v.
American League of Professional Baseball Clubs.
121
Beginning with the appeal's procedural posture, the recent decision by
the District Court came as an appeal by both the MLUA and MLB of the
May 11, 2001 decision by arbitrator Alan Symonette.122 In general,
Symonette upheld MLB's claim that the resignations by the umpires were
not protected activity under the NLRA, and that MLB was therefore within
119. Mike Kiley, Ump Gives His Side Of Story, CHICAGO SUN TIMES, Aug. 3, 1999, at
92.
120. Schmuck, supra note 35.
121. No. 01-2790 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2001). As of January of 2003, this case has not
been published. All page numbers refer to the page of the actual decision as submitted by
Judge Bartle. At the time of publication, appeals are pending in the Third Circuit.
122. Id. at *5-6.
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its rights to accept some of the resignations.1 23 Symonette did, however,
force MLB to allow nine of twenty-two umpires to rescind their
resignations, two from the AL and seven from the NL. 1 4 The AL umpires
were ordered reinstated for lack of evidence as to the existence of one of
the resignations, and because of the timing of the other resignation; the NL
umpires were ordered reinstated due to problems with the method used by
the NL in determining which resignations to accept. 125 Still, and most
important to the analysis at hand, Symonette did find that MLB was
entitled to accept most of the resignations and hire permanent
replacements. 26 The MLUA appealed in an effort to reinstate all umpires
who were let go, while MLB appealed to be granted the right to accept all
twenty-two resignations.
127
While also presented with questions of scope of review and
arbitrability, a substantial part of the District Court's opinion concerned the
legal effect of the MLUA's resignation letters, and the legality of MLB's
response. First, the court dismissed the MLUA's claim that the letters of
resignation were not binding, but rather a form of protest motivated by a
128desire to spark negotiations with MLB. Instead, the Court found that
each umpire who submitted a letter used language and terms that showed
that he was intending to resign of his own free will.129 The Court noted that
each letter not only used the exact phrase "I hereby resign," but also that
the letters invoked Article VIII.D of the Basic Agreement, entitled
"Termination Pay Where Termination is By Umpire."' 30  The Court
believed that any other interpretation of the letters would violate the
MLUA and MLB's contract.131 As stated previously, the contract barred
any strike or work stoppage by the umpires. If the resignations were not
meant to be binding, it would simply be an attempt to bypass this clause
and violate the contract. Therefore, according to the Court, the resignation
letters were exactly that: resignation letters.
Second, the Court addressed MLUA's claim that the MLB was
required to rehire all of the umpires who rescinded their resignations,
despite the fact that replacement workers had been hired before the
resignations were rescinded. The Court pointed to two arbitration cases
which state very plainly that if the employer relies on a resignation and
searches for a replacement, the employer is not obligated to allow an
123. Id. at *6, 13.
124. Id. at*14-16.
125. Id.
126. Id. at*13.
127. Id. at *6.
128. Id. at *14.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at *14.
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employee to rescind a resignation. 32 However, each case came to this
conclusion with somewhat different interpretations of the same principle.
First, in Summit Finishing Company, Inc. and the United Steel
Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Local No. 3215, after a heated argument
with a supervisor, an employee gave his two week notice of resignation.'33
Later, while appearing much calmer, he reiterated his intent to resign.
134
Days later, after supervisors had already begun to search for a replacement,
the employee sought to rescind his resignation.135 The arbitrator stated that
a resignation with notice is binding as long as it is given with the intent to
resign. 36 The arbitrator believed that the point of two weeks notice "is to
afford the employer an opportunity to find a replacement before the
employee leaves his employment .... Were an employee free to retract a
two week notice anytime before the two weeks had expired, the notice
would have no effect."'' 37 By this logic, most any notice of resignation is
binding, assuming the employer accepts the resignation and begins
searching for a replacement.
The second case to which the court pointed also focused on reliance
by the employer in searching for replacements, but likened it to the
common law contract principle of offer and acceptance. In Roadway
Express, Inc. and Local 707, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, an
employee submitted her resignation, effective almost a month from the date
of the letter, but chose to rescind the resignation a week later.138 At this
point, the employer had already elevated another employee to the resigning
employee's position, had elevated yet another employee to fill the vacancy
by the ascending employee, and had posted the vacancy of the job left open
by the internal moves.13 9 The arbitrator advanced three separate examples
of offer and acceptance to show that the resignation could not be rescinded.
First, the arbitrator deemed the employee's letter to be an offer for the
employer to accept. 14 While the union claimed that the employer never
formally accepted the offer, the arbitrator found acceptance when the
employer posted the employee's job as a vacancy.14 Next, the arbitrator
also found an offer in a provision of the employment contract used at the
132. Id. at*15.
133. Summit Finishing Company, Inc., 86 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1160, 1160 (1986)
(Archer, Arb.).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Roadway Express, Inc., 109 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1064, 1064 (1997) (Nathan,
Arb.).
139. ld.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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company, allowing that "any employee could sever her seniority by
voluntarily resigning.''142 The letter of resignation by the employee was
effectively viewed as an acceptance of the contractual provision allowing
the employee to sever the seniority position upon her own 
request. 143
Lastly, the arbitrator pointed to the reliance of the employer on the
resignation when he made the offer to the other two employees to elevate
their positions, and the reliance of these employees in accepting these
offers. 144  Putting further emphasis on this reliance created by the
employee's resignation, the arbitrator stated the following: "That the
employee who quit, thus instigating the chain reaction vacancy filling, now
wanted to return to her former position is not in and of itself sufficient
cause to dash the expectations of two other employees.145
Following the reasoning in these two cases, the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania denied the MLUA's injunction seeking to reinstate all
umpires; instead, seven AL umpires were denied reinstatement. 146 A first-
come, first-served approach was used to rehire the umpires until their roster
was full, meaning that the nine umpires without jobs were simply the last
nine to rescind their resignations.147 As for the two rehired umpires, the
Court found that one never actually resigned, while the other rescinded his
resignation earlier than originally thought.1 48 The NL was a bit more
muddled: since the NL received all of the rescinded resignations at the
same time, they were not able to utilize the first-come, first-served
approach. Instead they used a "merit and skill" determination "to decide
which of the 19 Umpires [they] would retain of the 32 who had rescinded
their resignations."' 49 The arbitrator found that the method violated the
Basic Agreement, and ordered the NL to rehire seven umpires, which the
Court did not overturn.15 Lastly, the Court remanded the case back to the
arbitrator to rehear arguments for three NL umpires, because it believed
that the arbitrator used the wrong standard to decide their fates. 5 '
Aside from the remand and the reinstatement of nine of the twenty-
two umpires, two important points emerge from the Court's opinion. First,
despite the MLUA's claim that the resignations were not intended to be
actual, the language employed by the umpires in their letters established a
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Major League Umpires' Ass'n v. Am. League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, No. 01-
2790, at *24 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2001).
147. a d. at 15.
148. Id. at 15-16.
149. Id. at *16.
150. Id. at *6, 18.
151. Id. at*22.
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legal intent to resign. Second, where an employer relies upon a resignation
and searches for replacement workers, the resignation is binding, and any
possible reinstatement of the resigning employee is left to the employer's
discretion. Despite the fact that nine umpires were allowed to go back to
work, ten were denied reinstatement. The MLUA was defeated, not only in
the courtroom, but also in its attempt to take the power of a lockout from
MLB.
VI. THE BENEFITS OF ACCEPTING A LOCKOUT, AND THE PENALTIES FOR
PREEMPTING ONE
In the collective bargaining system, when faced with a possible
lockout, a union has several options. First, it may simply come down on its
demands to a level satisfactory for management, thereby negotiating to
settlement and ending the dispute. However, very little, if anything, may
be gained by such a strategy. The union may also attempt to get the jump
on the employer and strike before it is locked out (providing its present
contract does not bar strikes, as was the case with the 1999 MLUA
dispute). A strike may catch the employer who is unprepared for a work
stoppage off guard, thereby gaining leverage for the union in the dispute.
Yet, unless the timing of the stoppage seriously disrupts the employer's
business, this is merely a moral victory. If a lockout was imminent, the
company would have already committed to some losses, meaning that the
leverage gained by a preemptive strike may not be large at all. Also, just
like the lockout, the employees are not earning money during a strike,
placing them in no better, immediate position than during a lockout.
Lastly, the union may simply allow the lockout to occur, hoping that their
continued absence will eventually be too damaging for the company to
weather, forcing the employer to come down on its position. Clearly,
accepting a lockout is a gamble, due to the judicially approved use of
temporary replacement workers. If the temporary workers do an adequate
job, the lockout may be extended for a considerable amount of time,
forcing the union to come down on its demands if its members hope to
return to work. In most cases, the damage to the employer during a lockout
will therefore be minimal, but at least the lines of negotiation will remain
open.
In the end, none of these three options sounds particularly desirable.
Two are gambles, and one is a forfeiture of the union's position. However,
aside from previously contracted arbitration, in almost all cases they are the
only viable options. As the MLUA learned, any other route can be
disastrous. By comparison, while the MLUA was truly defeated on all
fronts, the members of the NFLRA were neither winners, nor losers in their
dispute. Looking at what each union gained and lost by their actions
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during their respective disputes, it becomes clear that when a strike is
undesirable (or impossible, such as in the MLB dispute, where the
MLUA's contract contained a no-strike provision), and the union isn't
presently willing to come down on its demands, its only option is to accept
the lockout. While the chances of receiving everything desired in
negotiations are greatly diminished, also diminished is the chance of losing
all, as was the case for the ten umpires who lost their jobs.
By comparing what the NFLRA was seeking to what it received, it
would appear that the NFLRA was unsuccessful. While originally seeking
an immediate 200% to 500% pay increase, the referees eventually agreed to
return to work for an immediate raise of 50%, rising to 100% within two
years. 152 Yet, the referees still received what most professions would
consider an extremely large pay increase. Clearly, this largely favorable
outcome is not a common thread in most cases where unions accept being
locked out, but it does emphasize the gambling aspect of accepting the
lockout. Some unions do actually lose, forced to give up some benefit in
order to come to a settlement. Yet, at least it does not appear that when
subjected to a lockout, the employees are gambling with job security.
While temporary replacements have been deemed judicially acceptable, the
muddled case law concerning permanent replacements seems to state that
unless the employer has some extraordinary "legitimate, substantial
business justification for hiring such replacements," locked-out workers
cannot be permanently replaced. 53 Surely the NFLRA's decision to accept
the lockout was a gamble, for it not only agreed to go without a paycheck
for an undetermined amount of time, but it also had no guarantees that it
would have any of its demands fulfilled. But the fact that the NFL could
not have offered its replacement officials permanent contracts, thereby
severing all ties with the NFLRA, granted the referees job security
throughout the duration of the lockout. Taking this into account, the wager
does not seem as risky.
The MLUA, on the other hand, did not want to incur any risk, instead
searching for a way to avoid the gamble and give itself all of the leverage.
This failed, and essentially all was lost by a large percentage of MLUA
members. However, more than just the jobs of ten umpires were lost by
not accepting the impending lockout. Legal challenges that may have
favored the MLUA became moot once the resignation letters were
accepted.
First, as mentioned in Section IV.B., the legality of a possible lockout
by MLB after the 1999 season was less than certain. 54 The MLUA could
have made convincing arguments as to MLB's illegal motivations in
152. See Wong, supra note 8.
153. See generally Dunn, supra note 61, at 11.33.
154. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
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deciding to institute a lockout, resulting in arbitration, or court rulings in
the union's favor. By preempting the lockout, the umpires precluded these
potentially favorable outcomes for the union.
Second, prior to the resignation scheme, the MLUA believed that it
had valid complaints against MLB.155 In its original complaint seeking a
preliminary injunction against MLB, the union lists what it believed were
activities with the clear intent "to undermine the MLUA as the chosen
bargaining representative and to make changes to the umpires' terms and
condition of employment which violated the Agreement."' 56 The MLUA
cited MLB's attempt to take control away from the AL and NL with respect
to the umpires' supervision and evaluation, MLB's unilateral changes in
the strike zone, and MLB's alleged attempts to induce certain umpires to
retire by offering larger severance packages than granted by the
Agreement.' 57 Also, the MLUA had complained of what it considered the
league's unfair treatment of certain umpires and the lack of player
punishment in recent confrontations between umpires and players. 58
However, as MLB pointed out, The Major League Umpires' Association v.
American League of Professional Baseball Clubs concerned MLB's right
to accept certain resignations, not past alleged transgressions by either
party. 59 While these allegations may have deserved arbitration, as even
MLB conceded, not only were they misplaced in this specific litigation, but
as for the ten umpires out of a job, they were essentially moot points.
160
Arbitration would have only repaired these harms for the presently
employed umpires through possible injunctions (e.g., an injunction barring
MLB from exhibiting leniency towards players who aggressively confront
umpires), offering no effect for released umpires. Thus, the more you look
at it, the resignation scheme barred much more than employment.
Despite the results obtained by the umpires, it is theoretically possible
that a resignation scheme could work. In a retrospective interview, Richie
Phillips stated that he believed that the flaw in the umpires' scheme was in
their failure to remain unified: "The real miscalculation is that we
miscalculated the depth of the resolve of the umpires .... We were
shocked (when some umpires initially rescinded their resignations). We
did not have a plan for that."' 16' However, the true flaw might have been
155. See Insley, supra note 34, at 617.
156. Complaint of Plaintiffs at para. 16, Major League Umpires' Ass'n v. Am. League of
Prof'I Baseball Clubs, 591 PLIIPAT 145, 156 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (No. 99-4352).
157. Id. atpara. 18-19.
158. Insley, supra note 34, at 617.
159. See Answer of Defendant at Preliminary Statement, Major League Umpires' Ass'n
v. Am. League Of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 591 PLIIPAT 145, 156 (E.D. Pa. 1999)(No. 99-
4352).
160. Id.
161. Rich Hofmann, Umpires' Union Head Phillips Misread Members,
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the umpires' replaceability. It was simply too easy for MLB to hire
replacement umpires. The only possible way for such a scheme to succeed
in applying the appropriate pressure on an employer is when the employees
are truly irreplaceable. Only then would the employer be forced to choose
between two undesirable options: give in to the demands of the union, or
simply shut down its operation. Even in this situation, the success of the
plan truly depends on how imminent the future lockout is. As with striking
prior to a lockout, if the employer is already determined to lockout the
union, resignations may have little effect. Yet, as with the umpires, if the
resignations occur during a busy season in the industry, months prior to the
lockout, the employer may have to give in to the union.
Therefore, it is theoretically possible for a resignation scheme to work;
however, real world problems arise. In today's world of assembly line
manufacturing and computer automation, irreplaceable union employees
are extremely rare, if not non-existent. Very few if any industries are so
specialized that they would be able to exert this type of force without fear
of simply losing their jobs. Moreover, any attempt at this by a professional
sports union just looks silly. Every professional league has a
corresponding minor league or college program. Every player, coach, or
game official has a counterpart in one of these leagues programs, many of
whom would be more than eager to step into the shoes of the major league
employee if offered the opportunity. Any union that tries a resignation
scheme must be absolutely certain of their irreplaceability. As the MLUA
discovered, miscalculation of the probability of replacement will end in
pure disaster.
VII. CONCLUSION
While all sports puns have been strenuously avoided up to this point, it
is clear that the umpires of the MLUA dropped the ball. Conversely, it
appears that the NFLRA referees made the right call, possibly thanks to a
bit of help from instant replay. The success of the 2001 NFLRA strategy
may have been a direct result of the failure of the 1999 MLUA resignation
scheme. Having the benefit of watching baseball's mess, the NFLRA may
have learned that the possible gains and definite securities of accepting a
lockout vastly outweigh the considerable negatives of attempting a new
strategy. However, listening to the words of some MLUA members
immediately after turning in their resignations, most umpires also seemed
to know what they were getting themselves into: "There is always concern
Now He's Trying NLRB, Federal District Court, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Aug. 5,
1999, at Sports-7.
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that something like [MLB accepting the resignations] could happen,"
veteran umpire Jim McKean said on July 15, 1999, "but we're a proud
group." 62 As a defense to their actions, but evidencing full acceptance of
what the resignation letter meant, umpire Jerry Crawford said the
following:
We just think things have arisen this year that have indicated that
they are in the mind to put people out of work. I have my family
and everybody else has their family. They would much rather
have a sure thing rather than not have a sure thing. My pension,
my severance, whatever monies, through this basic agreement
that we have. These are all the sure things that we have. Rather
than lose them, I have decided to resign.
While Crawford himself was able to retain his job, in the end, all that ten
other umpires were left with was their severance pay, and their pride.
The notion of accepting a lockout as the best alternative under the
circumstances is counterintuitive. Nobody wants to let his opponent have
the upper hand. However, in most situations, if a labor dispute has reached
the point of an imminent lockout, the employer already has the upper hand
over the employee. When a lockout is imminent, the employer has made a
decision that he is willing to incur losses to the company's detriment, rather
than give in to his employees' demands. The company will continue to
incur these losses until either the employee bends, or the firm can no longer
withstand the damages. With the use of replacement workers, these losses
may be so minimal that they take a very long time, if ever, to have any real
effects upon the employer. While most unions contemplating an imminent
lockout would want to find a way to reverse the leverage to bear upon the
employer, it may simply be out of the union's hands.
Accepting the lockout will, in most situations, offer a certain degree of
job security, preserve legal contract claims, allow the employee to
challenge the legality of the lockout itself in the appropriate forum, and at
the very least will not sever negotiations. The MLUA would have had all
of these things at their disposal had they accepted a lockout. The bases
were juiced and the pitcher wasn't throwing his best stuff. Yet, just like the
Mighty Casey, the umpires struck out.
162. Schmuck, supra note 35.
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